Could the EU Adopt a Feminist Framework in its Legislation?

Image taken from pixabay

“A system cannot fail those it was never designed to protect” - W.E.B. DuBois

Gender Equality has always been considered a priority by the European Union, and, indeed, when it comes to legislative action on this topic, the EU has taken on a leading role globally through the proposal of pivotal norms, both in internal and external action, as part of a well rounded Gender Equality strategy, an agenda to tackle the Gender Gap in all its different forms. 

Interestingly enough though, such attentive focus on Women’ Rights has never overlapped with the definition of the European Union as a feminist actor. While third-wave feminism surely offers the means and the framework to collectively reflect on gender related issues (and not only those), its teachings have never been officially recognized as a concrete source for policy making by supranational agencies. And, whereas member states have dabbled in Feminist Foreign Policy, the EU does not make an exception. 

Therefore, the European Union appears like a power in the field of gender equality but it does not define itself as a Feminist power: is this a paradox? Where does the difference lie between a Feminist framework in legislation and the current strategy adopted by the EU? Is it possible for the two to coexist? And How much does this impact the policies’ effectiveness?

What is a Feminist Legislative Framework?

A legislative framework can be defined as feminist when it is rooted in feminist theory and principles. In particular, feminist legal theory recognizes the power that historically laws have had, and in some cases still have, in oppressing women and aims to reverse this trend by centering a gender inclusive approach in every aspect of policy making. Providing a unifying political framework for the different gender equality policies implemented by EU member states would help with accountability and effectiveness of said policies, making the progression of women’s rights smoother by improving coordination on a supranational level. 

As it can be inferred though, this definition is quite broad. Pinpointing the pragmatic consequences of a feminist approach is difficult, especially considering the many branches of feminism and their different specificities. Thankfully, in the case of the EU, the field can be narrowed down based on current legislation. When dealing with gender equality, in EU official documents the main theoretical benchmark is clearly liberal feminism, although lately the left-wing europarties have expressed the need for an approach closer to intersectional and postcolonial theory. However, as it will be discussed later on, the interpretation of these two movements is heavily influenced by liberal feminism, to the point that it is hard to even tell their contribution to the discussion at hand. The constant presence of liberal thought in EU law makes it easy to imagine that, if it was to influence an entire legislative framework, the feminist legislative framework itself would be liberal.

What’s the Difference Between Intersectional and Liberal Feminism?

But what does liberal feminism exactly entail? Other than an economic approach that fosters welfare inside a capitalist economy, liberal feminism focuses on three main topics: equality, empowerment and participation. 

From a theoretical point of view, liberal feminism continues the traditional political agenda of liberalism from a gendered perspective. This means focusing on enhancing and protecting individual women’s freedom. After the first two waves of feminism that (in Western countries) obtained political, reproductive and social rights, liberal feminism has shifted its focus on economic rights and representation. In policy making, this directly translates in a particular attention on labour market and political participation: it generally means that liberal theory is adapted to female demands for inclusion, representation and equality.

However, many feminists have criticised this approach, condemning liberal assumptions because they implicitly create categories that are too rigid, with the consequence of excluding entire social groups. Due to this, in general, liberal feminism overlooks crucial social problems such as classism and racism. It does not actively challenge society to change nor holds accountable different groups that are detrimental to the achievement of equality, empowerment and participation for all women. This is therefore seen as a compliance in upholding misogynistic and neocolonial dynamics and a stubbornness in considering strictly white middle class mindsets. For example, it has been argued that a liberal cosmopolitan approach to feminist foreign policy reproduces existing relations of power, including gender power relations and Western liberal modes of domination. The question that naturally follows is: how many voices aren’t currently being heard and how much will the situation worsen with phenomenons such as migration and globalisation that are creating multicultural societies all over the world? The answer to this question could be taking a step away from feminisms within liberal theory and look into more radical social theories such as womanism and postcolonial feminism. 

This is why the European Green Party proposed a shift to intersectional feminism as it aims to a more inclusive approach that considers the multiple oppressive systems to which a person may be subject to. Intersectionality recognizes that a black woman and a white woman live different life experiences not just because of their gender but also because of their race. The consequences of this new analytical tool are many. Equity, not equality, becomes the goal and participation takes on a nuanced meaning as it becomes relevant beyond gender. Intersectionality is, to use the words of the jurist who coined this term, a “lens through which you can see where power comes and collides, where it interlocks and intersects” (Kimberlé Crenshaw) and therefore creates a wide enough framework to deal with social problems on a larger scale.

In this discussion, it’s important not to forget that the EU positions itself in the global arena as a neo-liberal actor: therefore, when propositions like the one put forward by the Green Party are made, their implications are not meant to change the general economic position of the Union but to modify the approach on social issues. Intersectionality stems from Womanism, a black radical feminist movement, but the Green Party is aware that incorporating this tool into the domestic and foreign policymaking means bounding it to a liberal imaginary and therefore weakening its revolutionary and radical purpose by depoliticizing it. However, we need to bear in mind that, to a certain extent, moderating theoretical radical concepts is a natural consequence of institutionalisation and that policies that are exclusively based on liberal feminism have been accused of lacking contextual awareness. For example, many argued that the external action of the EU is too unaware of their neocolonial narrative of Western White Saviorism and therefore perpetrates damaging power dynamics for the local communities.

Why Does this Theoretical Distinction Matter on a Policy Level?

This distinction between liberal and intersectional feminist theory is particularly important when it comes to policymaking because it directly impacts the effectiveness and the range of action of different policies: Kimberlé Crenshaw, the womanist jurist who coined the term “intersectional”, goes as far as to argue that exist entire policy fields that miss the mark because of their “failure to include intersectionality”. The main problem is that this failure directly translates into an issue of inclusion when it comes to both the topics that are addressed and the voices that are being heard. 

Even though gender mainstreaming is considered a useful tool to reach gender equality, we often see that gendered approaches are confined into very specific settings and are not used by the EU as guidelines to create a coherent political agenda. Feminism is “siloed away” from external relations such as migration and defence with the result of policies in these fields being inconsistent with feminist theory all together: a clear example of this is the tension between inclusive militarism, which grants gender equality inside military institutions, and the anti-war feminist agenda, which condemns imperialism, patriarchy and warfare by considering them forcibly interlinked. Liberal theory, however, even in this instance, reduces the discussion about militarism and feminism to a matter of “women are capable of that too”. This tendency is detrimental as it avoids openly talking about war as an oppressive system, decentering feminist discussion once again from a criticism to present social hierarchies to avoid reproducing existing relations of power to a less structural issue of equality inside an oppressive system. This undermines the progressive force of feminism and the power of the EU in external action: some rules apply to western countries, others to the rest of the world.

The constant reproduction of this liberal dynamic in different fields is the reason why, in order to have a working feminist legislative framework, liberal thought needs to be merged with theory coming from other feminist movements: while fem democrats keep working on empowerment and gender equality in an economic perspective, more radical actors could deal with incorporating an intersectional approach in discussing racism and decentering whiteness or external action and deconstructing colonialism. Mixing different points of views would allow the EU to get to true equity in many more fields than the ones it is currently reaching. Some may see this as an unlikely match: the liberals would be sceptical of the open criticism of capitalism and the radicals wouldn’t appreciate toning down their opinions to reach an agreement with them. However, to put it as Angela Davis would when it considers voting regardless of the candidates as a collective and strategic act, it’s less about finding a partisan champion to win and impose liberal or intersectional theory and more about “opening a space” and “increasing the pressure for change”. If the EU wants to actively protect all its female citizens from misogyny and foster an environment of true inclusion and equality, there needs to be a shift in mentality as certain social groups such as trans women and indigenous women are not protected as needed by the system in place. Starting with centering a feminist legislative framework that focuses also on intersectionality could offer the means to solve that.

Is the EU Politically Open to a Legislative Framework of this Kind?

A feminist legislative framework would be a proficient way to tackle social problems using a gendered intersectional approach but the EU does not define itself as a Feminist actor. This is a clear incongruence as gender equality policies stem from liberal feminist principles that, while arguably not inclusive enough, are indeed part of feminism understood more broadly. 

And here lies the first issue: the feminist label is actively or implicitly rejected by the vast majority of member states and by the EU altogether. Significant is the case of FFP in Sweden. Feminist Foreign Policy is a term used to describe a unifying approach first adopted in 2014 whose aim is to promote gender equality through external action and improve women’s rights worldwide. It is also referred to as feminist diplomacy due to the stress put by Margot Wallström, Swedish prime minister at that time, on the role of women in peacekeeping and peace negotiators. This framework, in the years between 2014 and 2022, grew in popularity and many other states adopted the same FFP label, adapting it to each country’s existing legislation and external relations approach. Among the states in the EU, France adopted it in 2019, Spain in 2021 and Germany in 2022. While these states are to this day maintaining their commitment to FFP, Sweden changed its approach in 2022 “because the (FFP) label obscures the fact the Swedish foreign policy must be based on Swedish values and Swedish interests” as Tobias Billström, minister of foreign affairs, put it. The statement underlines how, according to Billström, feminism is incompatible with national interest: this is not only concerning as it completely overlooks the transformative potential of feminist principles but it is also coming from the EU member state that is ranked higher in the Gender Equality Index. If a narrative that polarises state interest and feminism is brought on, the chances of using feminist thought as an effective tool to achieve gender equality are close to zero. Of course, one could also argue that as women make a considerable share of a state’s population, not adopting a feminist label that would give them a bigger chance to reach true equity is against national values and interests.

This political attention put on national sovranism is strictly connected to populist right wing parties and the rise of votes for the far right all over the continent is another component that signals the impossibility to actively implement a feminist legislative framework inside the European union. The only euro parties that seem to consider themselves feminist are the European Green Party and The Left, which together constitute a meagre seat share inside the European Parliament. Furthermore, feminism is widely understood as and has historically been a left wing movement, even in its more liberal speculations, because of its strongly progressive motives that oftenly clash with the traditional social behaviours. The absence of structural criticism of misogyny and patriarchy lead many to refuse “traditional feminism” or “right wing feminism”, as these movements redefine the word “feminism” to match right wing propaganda trying to “feminise” the Right, making it more relatable for female voters. Think about female rights representation in power holding positions: once in office these politicians often do not represent women's interests and after the campaign any references to gender issues are wiped off the political agenda. This interpretation of feminism moves dramatically far away from the true intent of feminist theory: systemic liberation from multiple systems of oppression for all women. It is difficult to imagine that this goal can be achieved by juxtaposing xenophobia, racism and transphobia to womens’ rights. As Anna Rossi-Doria, an Italian historian and feminist, claims: “the right deals with sexual difference according to hierarchy, immutability, while the women’s movement with solidarity and transformation”. In this light, right-wing conservative feminism appears to be a clear oxymoron.

It is also important to keep in mind that the protection of women’s rights inside the Union does not hold to a common standard: if there are member states that are currently adopting FFP, there are also countries that have experienced a backlash in Gender Equality such as Hungary, Austria and Italy. This shows that although the EU preaches to be a model in external action, in practice there are many issues concerning domestic legislation on sensitive gendered topics such as reproductive health and violence against women. Abortion is a clear example of enormous difference in legislation between member states on these topics: France has made free access to abortion a constitutional right while Poland has completely banned it unless it is the result of a crime or the life of the mother is at risk.

Lastly, the war in Ukraine obliged the EU to deal with militarisation and its active role in the conflict: as was explained before, feminisms are usually against any kind of war as it is seen as an ulterior oppression on the populations that are experiencing it. In this case, however, Ukrainian feminist have referred to Russia’s actions as imperialistic and therefore opened up a question usually found in postcolonial feminist theory: what is peace without freedom? The claim made here is that war is necessary as a reaction to imperialism and therefore falls under the right of a population to defend itself from cultural erasure to the point that Ukrainian feminists actively campaign for more military aid. Some have even argued that Sweden abandoning FFP is a direct reaction to Russia’s imperialism as it is its willingness to join NATO. The difficulty of defining a clear feminist view on warfare is still very relevant to this discussion, but surely the implementation of a feminist legislative framework would make it more difficult for the EU to explain and justify military interventions, not only economically, but also ethically; therefore, this conflict makes an implementation of such a framework even less likely.

Conclusion

A feminist legislative framework would be an invaluable tool for the EU to tackle gender inequality as it would foster collaboration between member states and define common goals through which evaluate the true level of equity inside the continent. According to many, a strictly liberal feminist attitude is inadequate to deal with the issues of all women and to ensure proper inclusion and representation. However it has enabled the Union to legislate in fields such as gender pay-gap and electoral quotas, and should therefore not be eliminated but integrated with a more radical and intersectional approach in those topics that have been up until now improperly handled like racism, sex work and colonialism. The goal is to set up a system designed to protect all its citizens that can be held accountable when it doesn’t. Unfortunately, the current political trends and the global geopolitical landscape make the implementation of such a framework not likely, even though the left wing European Parties appear to be heading in this direction when it comes to gender equality. This makes the discussion relevant for the way women’s rights are addressed in the present and for the options that will open up in the future.